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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4476
The authors use firm-level, cross-county data from 
Investment Climate surveys in 49 developing countries 
to investigate an important channel through which 
informality can affect productivity: access to credit 
and external finance. Informality is measured as self-
reported lack of tax compliance in a sample of registered 
firms that also answered questions on a large set of 
other characteristics. The authors find that more tax 
compliance is significantly associated with more access to 
This paper—a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to examine the causes and consequences of informality. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at rgatti@worldbank.org and mhonorati@
worldbank.org. 
credit both in OLS and in country fixed effects estimates. 
In particular, the link between credit and formality is 
stronger in high-formality countries. This suggests that 
firms’ balance sheets are relatively more informative 
for financial institutions in environments where signal 
extraction is a less noisy process. The authors’ results are 
robust to the inclusion of a wide array of correlates and to 
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I. Introduction 
 
Informality has been drawing increasing attention from academics and policymakers 
alike because of its important implications for government revenues, firm performance and 
overall private sector development. 
In this paper we use firm-level, cross-country data from Investment Climate (IC) surveys 
in 49 developing countries to investigate the relationship between informality – as proxied by 
firms’ self reported tax compliance – and an important correlate of productivity: access to credit 
and external finance. 
There are many angles to the concept of informality. Informality is the product of firms, 
workers, or/ and tax payers who decide, voluntarily or not, if and to what extent to enter the 
formal sector (see World Bank, 2007). This choice occurs across multiple margins. For example, 
firms might choose not to register their activity and thus operate completely outside the formal 
system, or to register their business but evade, completely or partially, social security 
contributions or taxation. In this work, we focus on a direct, albeit partial, measure of informality:  
firms’ self reported tax compliance, which can be interpreted as a proxy for informality among 
otherwise formal (registered) firms.  
When deciding how much to comply with taxation, firms trade off taxes outlays and 
“legality” on one side, against the possibility of retaining more profits at the risk of being found 
out and fined. A firm’s decision not to comply with tax and regulations can have important 
consequences at the aggregate level. Informality is said to likely decrease aggregate productivity 
by reducing average firm size. Informal firms also impose a negative externality on competitors 
because they can under-price their products, so that informal, less productive firms are more 
likely to survive. Finally, informality is said to affect firm productivity negatively (see World 
Bank, 2007). 
Notwithstanding a wealth of anecdotal literature on the topic, rigorous evidence on the 
channels through which informality affects productivity is scant.
2 This paper sheds light on one of 
the potential mechanisms through which informality can affect productivity: lack of tax 
compliance limits the extent to which balance sheets are informative for banks’ lending and 
effectively restricts firms’ access to credit and to external finance.  
Thanks to the richness of our data, we are able to relate firms’ self-reported tax 
compliance with a number of proxies for the extent of firms’ access to external finance. In 
                                                 
2 See, however, recent evidence in Fajnzylber et al. (2006), Kenyon (2006); and World Bank “Informality: 
Exit and Exclusion”, (2007);   3
particular, we regress these credit measures on a variable – FORMALITY – which captures the 
share of sales that is reported for tax purposes (see below for a detailed discussion) and on a wide 
range of firm-level correlates for more than 11,000 firms across 49 countries. Although OLS 
estimates provide a useful benchmark in this context, we focus our discussion on the results of the 
fixed effects specifications, to rule out that the inevitably large cross-country differences in 
compliance and financial market development drive our results.  
Fixed effects estimates indicate that higher compliance is associated with higher access to 
formal credit and external finance, however measured. Complying firms also resort less to credit 
from informal sources, such as family, friends and money lenders. Moreover, tax complying 
firms are less likely to report access to finance to be an obstacle. We interpret this finding as an 
indication that the association between credit and compliance reflects, at least in part, credit 
constraints and not simply a higher demand for credit from firms that – because of their tax 
compliance – have less funds available. 
We find that the association between formality and credit is stronger in countries with a 
higher level of average formality. These findings are consistent with banks relying on firms’ 
balance sheets as a signal of firm soundness in countries where official balance sheets are a less 
noisy measure of firms’ true quality. Conversely, in countries where informality is diffused, 
choosing to evade taxation is less likely to signal firm quality and banks might tend to develop 
alternative ways to assess credit worthiness, for example through relationship banking.
3  
Our estimates could potentially reflect reverse causation from access to credit to tax 
compliance or capture unobserved omitted firm-level characteristics. In particular, one could be 
concerned that (low quality) firms that are denied credit have an incentive not to pay taxes so as 
to use the extra cash flow to finance their activities. Similarly, low tax compliance and lower 
reliance on credit from informal sources could both be driven by unobservable managerial 
preference for informality or “cutting corners”. In order to address these concerns, we subject our 
estimates to a large battery of robustness checks. We first augment our basic specification with a 
number of firm-specific variables, including (log) sales and past growth (which we interpret as 
indicators of firm quality); and asset value (to capture collateralizable assets). Our results are 
robust to the inclusion of these additional regressors. 
Moreover, in order to attenuate the concern that unobserved characteristics drive the 
association between tax compliance and access to external finance, we employ a two-step 
estimation that exploits country-location-size averages of the extent of tax compliance to 
                                                 
3 A vast literature has developed on relationship banking. See for example Petersen and Rajan (1994) and 
Dell’Ariccia and Bonaccorsi (2004).   4
instrument for firm-level formality.
4 Average formality is strongly associated to individual 
formality but is unlikely to affect individual credit access through channels other than the 
individual incentive to pay taxes, especially since the potential direct channels of impact (firm 
size and location) are controlled for in the specification. Our estimates are robust to 
instrumentation.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the related literature. Section III 
describes the data, section IV presents some stylized facts, sections V and VI discuss the 
empirical methodology and estimation results, and section VII concludes. 
 
II. Literature  review 
 
Our paper is related to two distinct strands of literature: (i) the increasingly large body of work 
that investigates estimation and determinants of informality; and (ii) the literature that identifies 
access to credit as an important engine of growth. 
 
Informality is a multi-dimensional concept. Existing studies mainly differ in the way informality 
is defined and in the way it is measured. Two alternative definitions of informality are usually 
adopted. According to a legalistic definition, firms, workers, and tax-payers are “forced” to evade 
taxes or payroll contributions to social securities because otherwise they wouldn’t survive (for 
instance start-up firms that can’t bear the cost of compliance, or informal workers who would 
prefer a formal job but can’t find it because of labor market segmentation or heavy labor 
legislations). A “production” definition instead stresses the voluntary aspect of informality, which 
is seen as the outcome of an optimal individual or firm choice, given state enforcement and 
business environment (for example, registered firms that decide to evade taxation or workers who 
prefer to be self-employed or to start a micro business without registration because of a greater 
flexibility and lower tax burden – see World Bank, 2007 for a detailed review of these concepts). 
By now, a large literature on informality has developed (see, amongst others, 
contributions by De Soto, 1989; Loayza, 1996; Enste and Schneider, 2000; Johnston et al., 1999; 
Cunningham and Maloney, 2001; Azuma and Grossman, 2002; Schneider, 2002; Straub, 2005; 
Maloney, 2004; De Paula and Sheinkman, 2006; Dabla-Norris et al., 2007; World Bank, 2007). 
                                                 
4 Fisman and Svensson (2007) use a similar methodology to correct for omitted variable bias in regressions 
of firm growth on self-reported corruption. See also Dollar et al. (2005) and (2006); and Honorati and 
Mengistae (2007) on the use of locality/industry averages.   5
An important focus of these works is how best to estimate the size of the informal sector. 
Methodologies include using demand for cash (Tanzi, 1980), electricity inputs (see Johnston et 
al., 1998), and the MIMIC method (see Schneider, 2002 and World Bank, 2007 for 
comprehensive reviews).  
In parallel, many of these contributions investigate the determinants of informality. There 
is consensus that unevenly enforced and burdensome regulations (De Soto, 1989; Djankov et al., 
2002; Loayza et al, 2005; Loayza and Rigolini, 2006), corruption
5 (Friedman et al., 2000), 
financial development and entry costs (Straub, 2005) are significantly associated with 
informality.
6 In parallel, Loayza and Rigolini (2006) provide convincing evidence that the 
informal sector – as proxied by the share of self-employed workers in the labor force – is counter-
cyclical. 
In this paper we focus on a specific definition of informality – tax compliance (or lack 
thereof) by registered, formal firms – and, amongst others, we provide evidence of how this 
variable correlates with countries characteristics. In this sense, our paper contributes to this 
literature by proposing an alternative measure, albeit partial, of the size of the informal sector.  
 
Our main focus, however, is studying the link between informality and access to credit. In 
particular, we aim at providing systematic empirical content to the claims that informality affects 
productivity and its determinants in significant ways so as to inform on the channels through 
which these effects operate. This work is thus linked to the vast literature that identifies access to 
credit as an important engine for firm growth (see for example Claessens and Leaven, 2005 and 
Levine, 2005). In many of these models, access to credit affects productivity by alleviating 
information and transaction costs and making the longer-gestation, higher-return projects more 
attractive (see, for example, King and Levine, 1993; and Bencivenga et al., 1995). Using data for 
Bulgarian firms, Gatti and Love (2006) show that access to credit is robustly and significantly 
associated with TFP. In turn, Easterly and Levine (2001) provide macroeconomic evidence that 
total factor productivity (TFP) accounts for most of the variation in the cross-country differences 
in economic development and growth.  
Finally, the recent availability of firm-level data has spurred new interesting empirical 
work that is closely related to ours. Using Mexican micro firm surveys, Fajnzylber et al. (2006a) 
                                                 
5 In a companion paper (Gatti and Honorati, 2007) we investigate the relationship between formality and 
corruption at the firm level. Preliminary findings indicate that tax compliance is consistently negatively 
associated with bribe paying. 
6 A related literature addresses specific issues of tax compliance (see the review in Andreoni et al., 1998). 
However, because of data restrictions, empirical work on tax compliance focuses mostly on individuals.    6
find a positive causal link between formality – as proxied by tax compliance – and firm 
performance: they find that more formal firms have higher levels of profits and that their owners 
are less likely to go out of business. Kenyon (2006) uses data from the Brazil IC survey to study 
the link between tax compliance, equity issuance and foreign licensing. He finds a positive 
association between compliance and both of these variables. Using the same data for Brazil, 
Almeida and Carneiro (2006) investigate the impact of enforcement of labor regulation on firm-
level use of informal labor and productivity. Using firm-level, cross-country data, Almeida and 
Fernandes (2006) investigate the extent to which majority and minority foreign ownership affect 
innovation; and Ayyagari et al. (2007) analyze the determinants of firm innovation in emerging 
economies. They identify the characteristics of innovative firms and then focus on the role of 
access to finance, competition, and governance in facilitating firms’ ability to innovate.  
 
III.  Data description 
 
We use a rich database from the World Bank Investment Climate surveys project. These are firm-
level surveys conducted in a large number of developing countries between 1999 and 2005. The 
surveys share a similar sampling design involving the selection of a stratified random sample of 
firms from each country based on location and industry. Once we exclude countries for which 
variables of interest are missing, we are left with a sample of 49 countries and about 11,000 
firms.
7  
The IC surveys contain detailed information on firms’ characteristics such as size, firm 
age, industry, ownership structure, firms’ performance, innovation, as well as perception-based 
and objective measures of the investment climate, including access to finance, the efficiency of 
infrastructure services, labor market relations, and corruption. Moreover, in the productivity 
section, firms are also asked to report accounting variables for the current year and up to two 
years before. 
The number of firms surveyed in each country varies from the largest samples in Egypt 
(1,973 observations) to the smallest sample (47 observations) in Cape Verde. In order to take into 
account this asymmetry, we weight our regressions according to the country sample size. All 
countries cover the manufacturing sector; only some countries include firms operating in services 
and construction. We focus our analysis only on the manufacturing sector to limit heterogeneity 
and to maximize the number of countries in our sample. Similarly, we limit the analysis to fully 
                                                 
7 Although in some countries more than one survey has been conducted, we limit our analysis to the cross-
sectional dimension of the data as longitudinal information is still limited.   7
privately owned companies, since publicly owned companies are likely to face structurally 
different credit/informality trade offs. 
One of the critiques often raised to the IC surveys is that they are not fully representative 
of the country firms’ size distribution. In particular, since in most countries firms’ distribution is 
heavily skewed towards micro and small firms, large firms were over-sampled to allow 
meaningful analysis for all firm categories. This is a potential concern for our analysis: if smaller 
firms are more informal than large firms, (i.e. they report lower share of sales for tax purposes) 
we are likely to underestimate aggregate tax compliance. As most surveys do not report weights, 
we address this concern by weighing tax compliance in each firm category (micro, small, 
medium, large, and very large) using data from the International Financial Corporation (IFC) 
SME database as well as other individual census data on the actual distribution of firms by size in 
each country (see discussion further on). 
 
To proxy for informality, we use the percentage of sales that firms report to declare for tax 
purpose (FORMALITY). The distinct advantage of using this variable is that, unlike most 
indirect estimates of informality, FORMALITY captures a well defined concept: tax compliance. 
Clearly, the complementary drawback is that we measure only a portion of the informal economy. 
Although it is likely that FORMALITY suffers from measurement error, the lack of alternative 
audit-based measures of tax compliance that can be compared homogenously across a large 
number of developing countries makes this variable a particularly useful starting point to address 
these issues. 
Descriptive statistics reported in tables 1-3 indicate that the degree of tax compliance 
increases linearly with firm size, ranging from an average of 72% of sales declared in micro firms 
to an average of 86% in very large firms. Tax compliance is higher in high-tech technology 
industries, particularly in “metals and machinery” and “chemicals and pharmaceuticals”, and 
lower in more traditional, labor intensive sectors such as “leather” and “wood and furniture”.
  8 
There is substantial variation across world regions, with lowest average tax compliance in Sub-
Saharan Africa and highest in OECD countries.
9 
  As for our outcome variables, we measure access to credit with a binary indicator of 
whether or not the establishment has an overdraft facility or line of credit (CREDIT), and also by 
                                                 
8 In the definition of high and low tech firms, we follow Parisi et al. (2006) Low-tech firms are those 
operating in food, beverages, garments, leather, textiles, wood and furniture, non-metallic and plastic 
materials, paper, other manufacture, and agro-industry.  High-tech firms are those operating in metal and 
machinery, electronics, chemicals and pharmaceutics, auto components and other transport equipment. 
9 OECD countries in the ICS are: Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, South Korea, and Spain.   8
using alternative measures of reliance on external or informal financial sources. These are 
indicator variables taking value 1 if firms report obtaining financing for their working capital or 
new investment from external sources such as banks, leasing arrangements, and credit cards; or 
informal sources such as family loans, money lenders, and trade credit. Tables 1-5 report sample 
statistics. 
 
IV.  Some stylized facts 
 
In this section, we briefly describe how our measure of formality covaries in the aggregate with 
income and other measures of the size of the informal sector that have been used in the literature. 
In particular, we compare the average country percentage of sales not reported for tax purpose 
with Schneider’s (2005) estimates of the shadow economy, and Loayza and Rigolini’s (2006) 
self-employment ratio.  
Simple cross-country correlations indicate a moderate positive correlation between 
FORMALITY_AVG and (log) per capita income (0.29), and a low correlation with Schneider’s 
(-0.12) and Loayza and Rigolini’s (-0.06) estimates of the shadow economy.
10 The partial overlap 
between tax compliance and the existing measures of informality reflects different measurement 
methodologies as well as different angles of the concept of informality. In particular, unlike 
estimated informality from money demand equation or MIMIC models, tax compliance is a direct 
measure of informality. Thus, self-reported tax compliance is probably a more precise measure of 
a partial concept of informality, as turnover of non-registered (i.e. fully informal) companies or 
income of self-employed workers is not captured by our measure. As such, our measure of 
informality is an important complement to the existing ones. 
Interestingly, we find little correlation between FORMALITY_AVG and countries’ 
corporate tax rate, indicating that differences in tax rates are more likely to affect firms’ choices 
on the margin between formality and informality rather than the extent of tax compliance for 
registered firms. Not surprisingly, we find that in the aggregate formality is highly correlated with 
access to credit as measured by the share of firms with a credit line (fig.1-5).  
As previously noted, the IC surveys have a bias toward large and mature firms, so that we 
might be concerned about the representativeness of simple averages. To gauge the extent of the 
potential gap, we use data on firm distribution by size to compute weighted averages of formality 
within countries. In particular, we use the percentage of establishments by size class from Kozak 
                                                 
10 See also World Bank (2007).   9
(2007) to construct weighted country averages.
11 Disaggregated data on firm size and weight by 
classes are available only for 37 countries. When compared with actual firm distribution by size, 
we find that weighted and unweighted tax-compliance covary well (correlation of 0.93). The 
simple average overestimates formality by 1 percentage point across the 37 countries. Weighted 
and unweighted averages are plotted in figure 6. Correlations between the aggregate measure of 
formality and a number of countrywide indicators for financial markets are reported in table 6. 
 
V.  Empirical methodology and basic estimation  
 
In this section, we present the results of OLS and FE estimation for our main variables of interest. 
For all of the regressions, we use a simple specification of the type 
 
ikj ikj ikj k j ikj X formality credit ε γ β δ α + + + + = * *  
 
where we regress different measures of access to credit on formality and a large number of basic 
controls (X) that include categorical dummies for firms size; firm’s age; whether the firm exports 
(0/1 indicator); whether the firm is foreign owned (more precisely, an indicator taking value of 1 
if at least 10% of the firm is owned by foreigners); within country location dummies; industry 
dummies; and a dummy for whether the manager has some years of college education or more. 
Note that subscripts i, k and j index respectively firms, industry, and countries.  j α  and  k δ  
capture country and industry specific intercepts in the fixed effects (FE) estimation.
12 
 
We first measure access to credit as a 0/1 dummy indicating whether the firm has a credit or 
overdraft line (CREDIT). We report results from OLS and probit to provide benchmark estimates 
(table 7). However, since OLS and probit estimate coefficients from a combination of within- and 
between-country variation, these results could be driven by the correlation between better tax 
compliance and credit availability at the country level. This, in turn, could be the result of the 
level of institutional development in different countries. To make sure that country-specific 
                                                 
11Kozak (2007) compiles data from original census sources and reports shares of micro, small, medium and 
large enterprises for each country. 
12 An alternative empirical approach to gauge the impact of informality would be to estimate reduced forms 
where the TFP productivity residual is regressed on FORMALITY. Although this would provide a more 
comprehensive assessment of the effects of informality on firms’ performance, using an outcome measure 
that is based on reported sales (as productivity is) could introduce built-in biases, especially if firms sales 
reports to the interviewer pattern what is reported for tax purposes (and, hence, FORMALITY).    10
effects do not drive our results, we present country fixed-effects estimation and random-effects 
probit estimates.
13 We find that formality is positively and significantly associated with the 
chance of having a credit line under all of the estimation methodologies.  When country effects 
are not explicitly accounted for, a 10 percentage point increase in formality is associated with a 
1.5 percentage points increase in the chance of obtaining credit (probit) or a  2.6% increase in 
credit measured at the mean (OLS). With country effects, a 10 percentage point increase in 
formality is associated with effects about half the size of those obtained with OLS. This finding is 
not surprising, given the positive country-level association between formality and financial 
development that we documented in the previous section.  
 
Although informative, the variable CREDIT indicates whether a firm has a line of credit but does 
not discriminate between firms that would like to obtain credit but are denied loans, and firms 
that do not have credit because they do not need it.  We use subjective information on obstacles to 
access to credit to obtain some indirect evidence on this issue. In particular, firms were asked to 
indicate whether access to finance was “no obstacle (0); minor (1); moderate (2); or major 
obstacle (3)”. We find that formality is associated with less of a perception of obstacles in access 
to finance. We interpret these results as indicative that official balance sheets are an important 
basis for lenders’ decision-making and that partial tax compliance can result in limited access to 
rather than demand for credit (table 7, column 5). 
 
Firms’ official balance sheets are an important  – although not the sole – source of information in 
banks’ decision process. Moreover, firms’ officially declared turnover size might represent an 
effective constraint/ceiling for loan sizes. The extent to which balance sheets can provide reliable 
information is itself a function of formality. In particular, we expect balance sheets to be 
relatively more informative for financial institutions in environments where signal extraction is a 
less noisy process, such as in countries where tax compliance is higher on average. We thus 
interact the average level of formality at the country level with firm-level formality. As expected, 
the link between credit and formality is stronger in high-formality countries (table 8, column 1). 
To make sure that this relationship does not capture other spurious effects, we include in the 
regression an interaction of firm-level formality and average level of financial development as 
well as an interaction with (log) per capita GDP. The significance and size of the coefficient on 
                                                 
13 Probit random effects are estimated with quadrature, which is based on approximating the integral in the 
probability calculation with a polynomial. The quadrature formula tends to produce worse approximations 
in large panels (as in our case). However, when we experiment with different quadrature points, we find the 
estimated coefficient on formality to be stable.   11
the interaction between individual and average formality are unchanged. We also use interaction 
with industry-level formality, and find that out results are robust to this alternative measure. 
These findings lend support to the hypothesis that tax compliance matters for access to credit 
through an “information channel”. They are also consistent with the evidence in de la Torre et al. 
(2007) who, using data from recently fielded banking surveys, find that informality and low 
quality of balance sheets are the foremost constraint to SMEs lending in Argentina and Chile. 
 
To provide a more nuanced understanding of how formality relates to credit, we use alternative 
dependent variables, such as indicators taking value 1 if firms report to finance their working 
capital or new investment with external (EXTFIN) or informal sources (INFFIN). External 
sources include financing from banks, leasing arrangements, and credit cards while informal 
finance sources include financing from family and friends, and money lenders.
14 Consistent with 
the results estimated for CREDIT, firms with better compliance rely more heavily on external 
financing. Coefficients are significant both in OLS and FE. Estimated effects with FE are small, 
indicating that a one-standard deviation increase in formality is associated with about 2% of a 
standard deviation increase in the probability of obtaining external finance.  
 
More formal firms appear also to resort less to informal ways of financing. FE estimates are in 
this case larger than OLS, reflecting the likely negative correlation between development of 
informal credit networks and enforcement/tax compliance at the country-level (table 8). Note that 
formal and informal finance appear to be substitutes to some degree. In particular, reliance on 
informal (external) finance decreases (increases) linearly with size. For example, informal 
sources might fulfill completely the financing needs of smaller firms but as scale increases they 
might not satisfy credit demand. Informal, larger firms that lack proper documentation might then 
find themselves credit constrained. 
 
VI. Robustness  checks 
 
In our context, FE estimation provides an important robustness checks to the coefficients 
estimated with OLS, since they correct the bias driven by the correlations between country-level 
enforcement and development of financial markets. However, even after the country-effect is 
accounted for, a causal interpretation of the impact would be misplaced if the estimates still 
                                                 
14 Results are unchanged if we include trade financing in the definition of informal finance. 
   12
reflect unobserved firm-level effects. In particular, we could be concerned about omitted variable 
bias – in this case, the estimated coefficient would pick up a spurious correlation between an 
unobserved factor, which is correlated with formality and credit, and erroneously attribute this 
effect to formality; and reverse causation – if the correlation between formality and credit reflects 
a feedback mechanism from credit to formality. Finally, we could be concerned that tax 
compliance is reported with a substantial amount of noise. 
 
To deal with these as well as more basic concerns about the specification, we subject our results 
to a battery of robustness checks.  
First, we explore whether results are driven by specific industries or country groups. In 
particular, we run our FE specifications for the sub-samples of high- and low-tech industries. We 
find no significant differences in the relationship between formality and credit access. We then 
run the same specification separately for the different regions of the world that are represented in 
our sample – East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North 
Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the main relationship is not significant in the four East 
Asian countries, it is strong across Latin America and the Caribbean, and the whole of Africa 
(table 9).  
Second, we show that some basic modifications to our specification do not significantly 
affect our results. Because of the bunched distribution of formality (about 50% of firms report 
100% tax compliance), including formality linearly in the specification might not be appropriate. 
However, when we use indicator variables for formality equal or below specified cutoffs, results 
are unchanged. Moreover, as size is recognized to be an important determinant of both 
informality and credit, we experiment with alternative ways of controlling for it, by using (log) 
total employment, or including (log) firm sales in the specification. Results are robust to these 
changes (table 10). 
 
We now turn to the more worrisome issues of reverse causation and omitted variable bias. 
Reverse causation and omitted variable bias are potentially problematic issues in a cross sectional 
context. One could for example claim that firms that cannot obtain credit are more likely to 
reduce their tax compliance and use unpaid taxes to finance their operations. The correlation 
between compliance and access to credit could reflect unobserved firm “quality” – low quality 
firms might be shut out of the credit market and, as a result, have to “go informal”. These 
concerns can be in part mitigated by extending the (already quite exhaustive) list of covariates. In 
particular, we replicate the basic regression results for the three main credit dependent variables   13
including new correlates that might help control for specific omitted factors. Past firm 
performance is a good proxy for whether firms might be likely to obtain credit independently of 
the quality of balance sheets. When we include firm sales growth in the regression significance 
and magnitude of the coefficient of interest are unchanged (Table 11, col. 1-3). The share of the 
work force with more than secondary education (an alternative measure of firm quality) also does 
not seem to affect the results. Finally, categorical variables for whether the firm is at operating at 
50%, 70%, or at full capacity do not affect the credit coefficients substantially. 
 
It could also be argued that the size of a firm’s fixed assets are an important determinant of the 
likelihood of obtaining credit (because they represent collateral) as well as the propensity of a 
firms to pay taxes (because of the visibility associated with fixed assets). When we include in the 
regression the (log) net gross value of assets, results are unchanged. Likewise, controlling for the 
share of profits that are reinvested in the firm could account for the fact that non-complying firms 
have effectively higher profits and potentially lower demand for credit. We also include a number 
of ownership and behavioral measures to control in a more refined way for firm structure and 
ownership, and capture some further managerial preferences. To rule out the possibility that 
formality is just a proxy for whether a firm is incorporated (incorporated firms are usually subject 
to more stringent reporting mechanisms, which might make getting credit easier and evading 
taxes harder) we include a dummy for whether a firm is a privately held, limited company. 
Moreover, managerial preferences are more likely to be reflected in both tax compliance and 
credit if ownership is more concentrated. To rule out that this factor drives our results, we include 
the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. We should note that, although the 
coefficient on credit remains virtually unchanged, firms with a more concentrated ownership are 
significantly less likely to have a credit line. We also include a proxy for how geographically 
dispersed is production (number of establishments) which does not affect the results. Following 
Almeida and Fernandes (2006), we also control for a more refined measure of foreign ownership, 
to capture differential impact of majority and minority control rights (not reported). Finally, as a 
proxy for managerial preferences for informality, we include the share of sales that firms report to 
pay in bribes. Although this is positively and strongly correlated with the share of informal 
finance, the coefficients on tax compliance is unaffected. 
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VI.1 Instrumental approach 
 
Although these robustness checks are reassuring, in the absence of longitudinal data on firm 
characteristics, the possibility that unobserved managerial preferences for informality drive the 
association of interest cannot be completely ruled out.  To address this concern, we adopt a two-
stage estimation approach.  In particular, we use average formality in firms with similar location 
and size as an instrument for individual tax compliance. Within each country, location and size 
seem to be particularly relevant in determining firms’ incentives for tax compliance – firms in the 
same location are likely to deal with similar levels of enforcement and, thus, incentives to evade 
taxes. Also, firms of comparable size face similar incentives to comply with taxes, as the degree 
to which they can hide their turnover differ by size classes.
15 In a first-stage regression, location-
size averages of formality are good predictors of individual compliance. More importantly, there 
is no reason to expect that these variables would affect access to credit through channels other 
than individual compliance, especially since the specification controls directly for country, 
location and size dummies. In this context, location dummies account for average local 
institutional development, simultaneously controlling for credit availability and enforcement of 
tax compliance. Size dummies capture firm-specific incentives to compliance and the direct effect 
of size on access to credit. 
In line with the related literature where these methodologies are employed, we compute 
averages retaining only groups with more than 5 observations and we attribute to each firm an 
average that excludes the individual firm value from the computation 
(AVG_FORMALITY_CLS_J).
16 Thus we estimate a specification of the type  
 
ikj ikj ikj k j ikj X formality credit ε γ β δ α + + + + = * *  
ikj ikj i k j ikj u X cls formality avg formality + + + + = − '* _ _ '* ' ' γ β δ α  
 
where Xikj includes categorical controls for size and location. In the two-step estimation, we find 
average formality to be significantly and consistently associated with credit. On average, 
coefficients are higher than when estimated with individual formality with FE. This indicates that 
                                                 
15 The location indicator that is available form the “core” dataset identifies capital city; cities with more 
than one million inhabitants; cities with population between 200,000 and 50,000 inhabitants; and cities with 
less than 50,000 inhabitants.  
16 See Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2002) and Mengistae and Honorati (2007).   15
using averages might correct the attenuation bias due to substantial noise in firm-level formality 




We use firm-level, cross-county data from Investment Climate surveys in 49 countries to 
investigate the relationship between tax compliance and access to credit. Access to credit has long 
been recognized as an important engine of growth, while informality has increasingly attracted 
attention from academics and policymakers alike, especially because of its potential impact on 
firm performance.  
In this work, we focus on a well-defined concept of informality: tax compliance. Our 
sample of firms thus includes registered businesses which decide the extent of their tax 
compliance. Although tax compliance captures only a part of a much wider concept of 
informality, we provide aggregate evidence that this informality measure correlates in the 
expected direction with per-capita income and other accepted measures of informality across 
countries. 
We consistently find that more tax compliance is robustly and significantly associated 
with more access to credit, in OLS as well as in FE estimates. More importantly, we find that the 
link between credit and formality is stronger in high-formality countries. This suggests that firms’ 
balance sheets are relatively more informative for financial institutions in environments where 
signal extraction is a less noisy process. As widespread informality weakens, the perceived 
informational content of balance sheets, effectively a firm’s choice not to comply with taxes 
provides its competitors a further incentive to choose informality.  From a policy perspective, this 
underscores the fact that policies directed at improving the functioning of capital markets are 
unlikely to be fully successful unless they are complemented by policies – such as increased 
enforcement and simplification of tax codes – aimed at decreasing the level of informality and 
improving transparency. 
Although our results are robust to a large battery of checks, including controlling for an 
extensive list of correlates, using different measures of access to credit, and two-stage estimation, 
we cannot completely rule out that unobserved firm-specific effects might bias the estimated 
relationship between formality and credit access. The progressive availability of new rounds of 
surveys with a panel component will make it possible to address this issue in a fully satisfactory 
manner as well as it will allow estimating reduced forms to investigate the overall impact of 
informality on subsequent firm growth.   16
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Percentage of sales reported for tax purposes. 
Avgforma_cls_j  Average level of formality at the country-location-size excluding the 
reporting firm. Only averages for cells with more than 5 firms are 
retained. 
Credit  Dummy taking value of 1 if a firm has a credit line or an overdraft 
EXT  Dummy taking value of 1 if a firm relies on external sources (local and 
foreign banks, leasing and credit cards) to finance either working capital 
or new investment.   
INF  Dummy taking value of 1 if a firm relies on informal sources (family and 
friends, money lenders, and trade credit) to finance either working capital 
or new investment. 
Obstacles to finance  Categorical variable taking values: 0 if the firm reports no obstacles to 
access to financing, 1 (minor obstacles) 2 (moderate obstacles) 3 (major 
or very severe obstacles).   
Size  Categorical variable taking values: 1 (micro: 1-9 employees); 2 (small: 
10-49); 3 (medium: 50-99); 4 (large:100-249); 5 (very large: 250+). 
Log total employment  Logarithm of the sum of permanent and temporary workers. 
Fowned  Dummy taking value of 1 if more than 10% of the firm’s capital is 
foreign owned. 
Age  Business age calculated as the difference between the year of the survey 
minus the year when the firm started operations. 
Exporter  Dummy taking value of 1 if the firm exports more than 10% of total 
sales. 
Manager’s education  Dummy taking value of 1 if the manager has some university degree or 
more. 
Location  Categorical variable taking values: 1 ( if the headquarter is located in the 
capital city); 2 (other large city with over 1 million population); 3 (city of 
250,000-1 million); 4 (city of 50,000-250,000); 5 (town with less than 
50,000 inhabitants). 
Log sales  Logarithm of total sales. 
Log fixed assets  Logarithm of net book value of machinery and equipment. 
Sales growth  Sales growth (from retrospective information). 
Corporation  Dummy taking value of 1 if a firm is publicly listed company or private 
held, limited company. 
Concentration  Percentage of shares owned by largest shareholder. 
Reinvested earnings  Share of net profits reinvested (not distributed to owners). 
Establishments  Logarithm of number of establishments in the country. 
Workforce education  Percentage of firm’s work force with secondary school degree  or higher. 
Bribes  Percentage of sales in bribes. 
Capacity  Categorical variable taking values: 1 if the firm’s capacity utilization is 
less than 50%; 2 if  it is between 50 and 80%, 3 if it is above 80%. 
Log GDP per capita  Log of GDP per capita is in US$ at constant 2000 prices, WDI. 
Financial Development  Private Credit By Deposit Money Banks over GDP, Beck et al. 2001. 
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Table 1.a Tax Compliance by Region and Income 
Region Mean  Share  of 
Firms 
N. Countries 
      
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.685  18%  29 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.769  36%  18 
Europe & Central Asia  0.795  20%  27 
East Asia & Pacific  0.814  11%  6 
Middle East & North Africa  0.833  9%  6 
South Asia  0.921  1%  1 
OECD 0.948  4%  7 
      
Low income  0.739  21%  31 
Upper middle income  0.770  28%  35 
Lower middle income  0.789  46%  21 
High income: non OECD  0.942  0%  1 
High income: OECD  0.948  4%  6 
      




Table 1.b Tax Compliance by Industry 
Industry Mean  N  Share  of 
Firms 
      
Wood and furniture  0.713  2443  10% 
Leather 0.722  594  3% 
Garments 0.742  3911  17% 
Food 0.768  3779  16% 
Non-metallic and plastic  0.781  1770  8% 
Textiles 0.797  1898  8% 
Paper 0.854  358  2% 
Beverages 0.877  1193  5% 
Low-Tech  0.770 17033  73% 
     
Other transport  0.735  48  0% 
Auto and auto components  0.737  322  1% 
Metals and machine  0.803  3696  16% 
Chemicals and 
pharmaceutics 
0.822 1830  8% 
Other manufacturing  0.828  1087  5% 
Electronics 0.840  356  2% 
High-Tech  0.807 6252  27% 
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Table 2.  Distribution of Firms by Formality Degree 
  Average Tax 
Compliance 
Share of Firms  
  Degree of Tax Compliance 
  <0.50 0.50-0.75  0.76-0.99    1 
Size:      
Micro (1-9)  0.713  22% 18% 19% 40% 
Small (10-49)  0.767  17% 18% 18% 47% 
Medium (50-99)  0.817  13% 14% 19% 55% 
Large (100-249)  0.825  12% 12% 17% 58% 
Very large (250+)  0.873 10%  7%  15%  69% 
Tax rate perceived as an obstacle 
to firm's activity 
0.752  18% 19% 18% 45% 
Tax administration perceived as 
an obstacle to firm's activity 
0.746  18% 20% 19% 43% 
Access to finance perceived as an 
obstacle to firm's activity 
0.743  19% 19% 17% 45% 
Have a line of credit  0.799  14% 16% 17% 53% 
External finance>50%  0.811  17% 14% 15% 55% 
Informal Finance> 50%  0.699  29% 17% 17% 36% 




Table 3.  Access to Finance Variables 









  (mean) (mean)  (mean) (mean)  (mean)  (mean)  (mean) 
             
Micro (1-9)  0.58 0.21  0.23 0.19  0.19  0.01  0.19 
Small (10-49)  0.71 0.44  0.40 0.17  0.35  0.02  0.36 
Medium (50-99)  0.77 0.63  0.55 0.12  0.48  0.05  0.50 
Large (100-249)  0.78 0.64  0.53 0.08  0.48  0.07  0.50 
Very large (>250)  0.84 0.64  0.55 0.07  0.47  0.11  0.50 
             
Total  0.72 0.48  0.43 0.14  0.37  0.05  0.39 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Formality 11923  0.724  0.332  0  1 
Finance Indicators         
Credit 11923  0.480  0.500  0  1 
Obstacle to Finance  30516  1.534  1.262  0  3 
EXT 11708  0.429  0.495  0  1 
INF 11708  0.140  0.347  0  1 
Local Banks  11708  0.152  0.259  0  1 
Foreign Banks  9586  0.013  0.077  0  1 
Banks 11708  0.163  0.268  0  1 
Controls         
Log sales  10779  5.232  4.397  -13.18  21.64 
Log fixed assets  9096  3.612  4.253  -15.50  19.95 
Reinvested earnings  6674  56.632  41.684  0  100 
Sales growth  8346  0.036  0.732  -14.53  11.45 
Capacity   11450  2.293  0.679  1  3 
Fowned 11923  0.133  0.340  0  1 
Corporation 11923  0.601  0.490  0  1 
Concentration 11222  71.611  27.940  0  100 
Age 11923  18.580  16.703  0  155 
Exporter 11923  0.257  0.437  0  1 
Manager education  11923  0.660  0.474  0  1 
Workforce Education  7270  44.752  30.926  0  100 
Log Total Employment  11923  3.721  1.515  0  19.76 
Industry 11923  7.044  4.692  1  27 
Location 11923  2.378  1.401  1  5 
Establishments 9222  1.985  7.828  0  302 
Bribes 8251  0.021  0.065  0  1 
Log GDP per capita  10353  7.203  1.032  4.45  9.00 
Sample restricted to “Credit” regression. 
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Table 5: Correlations at the Firm Level 
  Formality Credit  EXT  INF  Banks  Size  Age  Fowned  Exporter Manager's 
education 
Formality  1.000                  
Credit  0.136 1.000                 
EXT  0.087 0.430 1.000               
INF  -0.080 -0.079 0.027  1.000             
Banks  0.071 0.326 0.703 -0.057  1.000           
Size  0.198 0.243 0.194 -0.105  0.156  1.000         
Age  0.089 0.157 0.089 -0.072  0.083  0.203  1.000       
Fowned  0.093 0.029  -0.029 -0.088  -0.011 0.280  -0.025  1.000     
Exporter  0.109 0.129 0.123 -0.082  0.106 0.467  0.043  0.244  1.000   
Manager's 
education 
0.156 0.182 0.146 -0.033  0.098  0.350 0.121  0.165  0.207  1.000 
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Table 6: Correlations at the Country Level 

















Ln GDP per 
capita 
     
Formality  1               
Weighted Formality  0.9349  1             
Schneider  -0.1178  -0.0436  1            
Self-employment  -0.0619  -0.241  0.318  1           
Share of Firms with Credit  0.5533  0.2471  -0.0014  0.0835  1         
% Needs Financed with 
External Finance 
0.3837  -0.0746  -0.2839  0.0763  0.7156  1       
Private Credit/GDP  0.3085  0.1075  -0.4552  -0.2855  0.6088  0.4507  1      
Getting Credit   -0.0537  0.13  0.3042  0.5693  -0.3621  -0.3128  -0.3755  1     
Absence of corruption  0.2151 -0.0327 -0.3596 -0.3388 0.2338  0.2391  0.4041  -0.28  1     
Corporate Tax  -0.1115 -0.1478 0.0355  0.101  -0.2793  -0.2559 -0.0275  0.2056  0.0635  1   
Log GDP per capita  0.2868 0.1201 -0.4799  -0.51  0.5054  0.432  0.6968  -0.5929 0.5061 -0.3798  1 
 
Schneider is the informal production as percentage of GDP, Schneider, (2002). Self-employment is the percentage of self employed workers with respect to total active population, ILO,  
Loayza and Rigolini, (2006). Private credit/GDP is Private Credit By Deposit Money Banks over GDP, Beck et al., (2001). Corruption: ICRG index of absence of corruption. Corporate 
tax rate: Top corporate Tax Rate for All Fund Member Countries, IMF 2006. Getting Credit is a rank index based 4 indexes: strength of legal rights index, depth of credit information 
index, public credit registry coverage, private credit bureau coverage, Doing Business. Log of GDP per capita is in US$ at constant 2000 prices, WDI. 
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Table 7. Access to Credit: Probit Marginal Effects, OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates 
Dependent Variable  Credit Obstacle  to 
Finance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation  DPROBIT OLS  FE XTPROBIT FE 
Formality  0.144* 0.120* 0.051* 0.183* -0.107* 
  (2.923) (2.936) (3.767) (3.885) (-2.717) 
Fowned  -0.090*  -0.086* -0.029**  -0.105** -0.295* 
  (-3.085) (-3.137) (-2.295) (-2.451) (-8.155) 
Age 0.002*  0.002*  0.000***  0.002**  -0.003* 
  (3.100) (3.190) (1.856) (2.049) (-4.146) 
Exporter 0.107*  0.098*  0.025**  0.080**  0.013 
  (3.353) (3.258) (2.435) (2.285) (0.424) 
Manager’s  education  0.106* 0.093* 0.059* 0.201*  0.050*** 
  (3.452) (3.273) (6.312) (6.378) (1.845) 
Size dummies: Small  0.207*  0.159*  0.105*  0.374*  -0.087** 
  (6.975) (6.406) (8.485) (8.562) (-2.433) 
Medium  0.314* 0.264* 0.207* 0.692* -0.120* 
 (7.593)  (7.282)  (12.892)  (12.545)  (-2.593) 
Large  0.325* 0.276* 0.247* 0.832* -0.178* 
 (6.344)  (6.061)  (14.890)  (14.500)  (-3.691) 
Very  Large  0.307* 0.253* 0.274* 0.939* -0.303* 
 (5.389)  (4.775)  (14.927)  (14.710)  (-5.676) 
Location dummies: City pop> 1mil   0.093  0.089  0.006  0.038  -0.030 
  (0.948) (1.006) (0.419) (0.817) (-0.734) 
250,000<Pop<1,000,000 0.000  0.004  0.027**  0.105**  0.046 
  (0.000) (0.113) (2.051) (2.381) (1.199) 
50,000<Pop<250,000 0.022  0.021  0.025***  0.092**  -0.058 
  (0.465) (0.528) (1.916) (2.108) (-1.532) 
Pop<250,000 0.080**  0.073**  0.011  0.060  -0.052 
  (2.108) (2.156) (0.635) (1.098) (-1.068) 
Cons   0.045  0.227*  -0.999*  2.036* 
   (0.713)  (10.696)  (-10.712)  (33.048) 
Number of observations  11923  11923  11923  11923  11396 
Number of countries  49  49  49  49  48 
Adjusted R2  0.1354  0.1673  0.1089    0.0444 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. In Probit and OLS estimations errors are clustered at the country level. 
Significance: 01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Size dummies: reference category: micro firms; location dummies: 
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Table 8. Access to Credit: Interactions, OLS Estimates 
Dependent Variable  Credit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formality -0.453**  -0.816*  -0.329***  -0.251* 
 (-2.251)  (-2.993)  (-2.018)  (-3.033) 
Fowned -0.072*  -0.069**  -0.054**  -0.077* 
 (-2.709)  (-2.651)  (-2.051)  (-2.984) 
Age 0.002**  0.002**  0.001  0.002** 
 (2.327)  (2.312)  (1.616)  (2.677) 
Exporter  0.067** 0.065**  0.064** 0.069** 
 (2.454)  (2.420)  (2.421)  (2.250) 
Manager’s  education  0.069** 0.070**  0.069** 0.063** 
 (2.533)  (2.559)  (2.434)  (2.301) 
Size dummies: Small  0.151*  0.151*  0.154*  0.150* 
 (6.018)  (6.052)  (5.832)  (6.325) 
Medium  0.236* 0.236*  0.237* 0.235* 
 (6.717)  (6.644)  (6.270)  (6.752) 
Large  0.264* 0.264*  0.274* 0.266* 
 (5.714)  (5.768)  (5.542)  (5.775) 
Very  Large  0.246* 0.243*  0.255* 0.248* 
 (4.795)  (4.686)  (5.026)  (4.931) 
Log GDP per capita  0.076*  0.036***  0.042  0.076* 
 (4.786)  (1.967)  (1.628)  (4.631) 
Interaction: firm formality*country 
formality 
0.776** 0.755**  0.652**   
 (2.607)  (2.598)  (2.381)   
Average country formality   -0.203  -0.179  -0.303   
 (-0.686)  (-0.627)  (-1.118)   
Interaction: formality*Log GDP pc    0.056**     
   (2.533)     
Interaction: formality*financial dev.      -0.220   
     (-0.928)   
Financial development      0.647**   
     (2.353)   
Interaction: formality*country-industry 
formality 
     0.446* 
       (3.443) 
Location dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cons -0.256  -0.002  -0.095  -0.368* 
 (-1.069)  (-0.006)  (-0.391)  (-2.802) 
Number of observations  10353  10353  9993  10353 
Number of countries  43  43  40  43 
Adjusted R2  0.201  0.2031  0.2068  0.1968 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Significance: 01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Size dummies: reference category: 
micro firms.  
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Table 9. Financing from External and Informal Sources, OLS and FE estimates 
Dependent Variable  EXT EXT INF  INF 
Estimation  OLS FE OLS FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formality 0.066**  0.033**  -0.048***  -0.057* 
 (2.508)  (2.224)  (-1.708)  (-5.163) 
Fowned  -0.101* -0.087* -0.048* -0.050* 
  (-3.472) (-6.455) (-2.895) (-4.992) 
Age 0.002*  0.000  -0.001*  -0.001* 
 (2.795)  (0.780)  (-3.397)  (-2.765) 
Exporter 0.086*  0.053*  -0.007  -0.014*** 
 (3.555)  (4.648)  (-0.460)  (-1.729) 
Manager’s education  0.105*  0.052*  0.028***  0.023* 
  (4.268) (5.127) (1.887) (3.019) 
Size dummies: Small  0.120*  0.092*  -0.021  -0.018*** 
 (4.687)  (6.840)  (-1.172)  (-1.773) 
Medium 0.224*  0.180*  -0.037  -0.058* 
 (7.643)  (10.324)  (-1.637)  (-4.484) 
Large 0.198*  0.183*  -0.038  -0.081* 
 (5.164)  (10.159)  (-1.270)  (-6.102) 
Very Large  0.208*  0.219*  -0.031  -0.101* 
 (5.723)  (10.964)  (-0.589)  (-6.880) 
Location dummies: City pop> 1mil   0.071***  0.018  0.024  -0.009 
 (1.784)  (1.216)  (0.557)  (-0.768) 
250,000<Pop<1,000,000 -0.014  0.023  -0.019  -0.026** 
 (-0.489)  (1.594)  (-0.750)  (-2.483) 
50,000<Pop<250,000 0.062  0.042*  -0.025  -0.032* 
 (1.581)  (2.995)  (-1.188)  (-3.051) 
Pop<250,000 0.111*  -0.016  -0.030  0.004 
 (2.959)  (-0.880)  (-1.179)  (0.295) 
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cons 0.120**  0.258*  0.218*  0.250* 
  (2.290) (11.125) (7.351) (14.659) 
Number of observations  11889  11889  11889  11889 
Number of countries  49  49  49  49 
Adjusted R2  0.116  0.0648  0.0245  0.0293 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Significance: 01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Size dummies: reference category: 
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Table 10. Robustness Checks: High/Low Tech Industries and Regions of the World. 
Estimation: Fixed Effects. Dependent Variable: Credit. 
Sample  HighTech LowTech  EAP  ECA    LAC  MENA  SSA 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Formality  0.058** 0.050*** 0.008  0.041 0.048***  0.119* 0.052** 
  (2.103)  (3.207) (0.165) (0.917) (1.884) (2.975) (2.571) 
Fowned  -0.020 -0.033**  -0.036 -0.020  -0.057**  -0.009 -0.013 
  (-0.855)  (-2.207) (-0.859) (-0.230) (-2.263) (-0.294) (-0.708) 
Age  -0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001 -0.000  0.001**  0.001*** 
  (-0.060)  (2.026)  (0.132) (1.156) (-0.380) (2.239) (1.765) 
Exporter  0.034* 0.027** 0.011 -0.010 0.024  0.039***  0.043** 
  (1.665)  (2.183)  (0.286) (-0.272) (1.306) (1.684) (2.148) 
Manager's  education  0.025 0.069***  0.010  0.052 0.059*  0.092*  0.049* 
  (1.270)  (6.546) (0.294) (1.461) (3.706) (3.925) (3.212) 
Size  dummies:  Small  0.122***  0.098*** -0.010  0.153*  0.112* 0.108** 0.102* 
  (4.830)  (6.890) (-0.187) (3.199) (5.302) (2.169) (6.022) 
Medium  0.211***  0.204***  0.133**  0.299* 0.220* 0.176* 0.191* 
  (6.554)  (11.007) (2.072) (5.170) (8.164) (3.137) (7.189) 
Large  0.240***  0.248***  0.271* 0.326* 0.226* 0.198* 0.263* 
  (7.254)  (12.844) (4.045) (5.594) (7.800) (3.608) (9.252) 
Very  Large  0.311***  0.261***  0.277* 0.299* 0.258* 0.288* 0.244* 
  (8.255)  (12.290) (4.013) (4.617) (7.738) (5.028) (7.483) 
Location  dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cons  0.175 0.213***  0.185**  0.129***  0.370* 0.006 0.168* 
  (1.349)  (9.255) (1.989) (1.873) (8.554) (0.088) (4.356) 
Number of observations  2,957  8,966  1070  1066  4418  1884 3264 
Number of countries  46  49  4  1  10  4  28 
Adjusted  R2  0.082  0.108 0.135 0.064 0.105 0.053 0.294 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Significance: 01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Size dummies: reference category: micro firms. 
EAP: Cambodia, Mongolia, Philippines and Vietnam; ECA: Turkey. LAC: Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica Republic, 
Ecuador, , El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua; MENA: Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman; SSA: Angola, 
Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, 
Congo, Zambia. 
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Table 11. Robustness Checks. Estimation: Fixed Effects 
  Credit EXT  INF  Credit EXT  INF Credit EXT  INF Credit EXT  INF 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) (12) 
Formality        0.049* 0.031** -0.057* 0.030**  0.021  -0.058*  0.032*** 0.007  -0.071* 
        (3.607) (2.091) (-5.173) (2.088) (1.339) (-5.050) (1.848) (0.336)  (-5.255) 
 Formality indicators:  
.5<Formality< =.75 
0.031**  0.017  0.009            
  (2.380)  (1.174)  (0.840)            
.75<Formality< 1 
0.041*  0.048*  -0.019***            
  (3.026)  (3.227)  (-1.770)            
Formality==1  0.040*  0.019  -0.050*            
  (3.394)  (1.464)  (-5.249)            
Log tot employment       0.062*  0.050*  -0.020*         
       (17.967)  (13.337)  (-7.109)         
Log Sales           0.036*  0.026*  -0.010*     
           (12.100)  (8.195)  (-4.021)     
Sales growth              0.008  0.005  -0.001 
              (1.190)  (0.645)  (-0.186) 
Size dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  No No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Location dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
                 
Number of observations  11923 11889  11889  11925 11891 11891 10779 10804 10804  8346  8373  8373 
Number of countries  49 49  49  49 49 49 47 47 47 32 32  32 
Adjusted R2  0.109 0.067  0.033  0.103 0.064 0.027 0.097 0.033 0.031 0.061 0.024  0.044 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Significance: 01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Size dummies: reference category: micro firms; location dummies: reference category: capital city.  
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Table 11. Robustness Checks (continued). Estimation: Fixed Effects.  
  Credit EXT  INF Credit EXT  INF Credit EXT  INF Credit EXT  INF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Formality  0.060* 0.040***  -0.073*  0.052* 0.031** -0.056* 0.035**  0.025  -0.054*  0.056*  0.032  -0.059* 
  (3.042) (1.811) (-4.898) (3.648) (2.011) (-4.977) (2.181) (1.419) (-4.188) (2.726) (1.405) (-3.801) 
Workforce education  0.001*  0.001*  -0.000***           
  (4.872)  (3.114)  (-1.903)           
50%<Capacity<80%      0.008  0.016  -0.024**        
      (0.645)  (1.153)  (-2.395)        
Capacity>80%      0.023***  0.007  -0.041*        
      (1.782)  (0.480)  (-3.914)        
Log fixed assets          0.018*  0.020*  -0.005**     
         (7.006)  (7.206)  (-2.555)     
Reinvested earnings            0.001*  0.001*  -0.000 
            (4.397)  (3.795)  (-0.349) 
Number  of  observations  7270 7272 7272  11450  11425  11425  9096 9142 9142 6674 6735 6735 
Number  of  countries  29 29 29 49 49 49 42 42 42 29 29 29 
Adjusted  R2  0.045 0.024 0.036 0.095 0.052 0.032 0.097 0.035 0.038 0.094 0.035 0.032 
              
Formality  0.050* 0.031**  -0.056* 0.055* 0.033**  -0.053* 0.053*  0.026  -0.064* 0.051*  0.028***  -0.042* 
  (3.677) (2.107) (-5.090) (3.924) (2.156) (-4.682) (2.953) (1.291) (-4.502) (3.310) (1.677) (-3.300) 
Corporation  0.046*  0.059*  -0.027*           
  (4.160)  (4.894)  (-3.000)           
Concentration      -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.000        
      (-5.165)  (-3.840)  (-0.223)        
Establishments         -0.015***  -0.002  -0.004     
         (-1.821)  (-0.259)  (-0.673)     
Bribes            0.029  0.150***  0.233* 
            (0.403)  (1.949)  (3.969) 
Number  of  observations  11923 11889 11889 11222 11210 11210  8211  8227  8227  8251  8256  8256 
Number  of  countries  49 49 49 48 48 48 33 33 33 46 46 46 
Adjusted  R2  0.127 0.075 0.031 0.114 0.067 0.029 0.065 0.027 0.041 0.110 0.078 0.029 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Significance: 01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *. Regressions include a constant term and additional controls as in the basic specification (age, exporting status, 
foreign ownership, manager education) and size, location and industry dummies.  34
Table 12. Instrumenting Using Formality Averages (country-location-size), 2SLS  
Dependent Variable  Formality Credit  EXT  INF 
Estimation  FE IV IV IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formality   0.143  0.209**  -0.211* 
   (1.6)  (2.125)  (-2.889) 
Avgforma_cls_j  0.505*     
  (16.770)     
Fowned 0.025*  -0.034**  -0.095*  -0.046* 
  (2.850)  (-2.546) (-6.644) (-4.359) 
Age 0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001* 
 (1.130)  (1.364)  (0.401)  (-2.787) 
Exporter 0.019*  0.029*  0.053*  -0.010 
 (2.668)  (2.656)  (4.469)  (-1.197) 
Manager’s  education  0.025* 0.056* 0.044* 0.027* 
  (3.940) (5.756) (4.095) (3.414) 
Size dummies: Small  0.016***  0.096*  0.083*  -0.009 
 (1.917)  (7.281)  (5.747)  (-0.888) 
Medium 0.028**  0.196*  0.165*  -0.048* 
 (2.490)  (11.016)  (8.561)  (-3.344) 
Large 0.025**  0.227*  0.163*  -0.075* 
 (2.090)  (12.366)  (8.131)  (-5.016) 
Very Large  0.037*  0.256*  0.197*  -0.090* 
 (2.770)  (12.044)  (8.598)  (-5.273) 
Location dummies: City pop> 1mil   0.015***  -0.002  0.019  -0.007 
  (1.665) (-0.110) (1.201) (-0.616) 
250,000<Pop<1,000,000 0.023**  0.019  0.020  -0.023** 
 (2.550)  (1.378)  (1.299)  (-2.035) 
50,000<Pop<250,000 0.026*  0.017  0.036**  -0.033* 
 (2.975)  (1.227)  (2.368)  (-2.925) 
Pop<250,000  0.026**  0.003 -0.032 0.014 
  (2.160)  (0.147) (-1.614) (0.938) 
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  11477  11477  11477  11477 
Number of countries  49  49  49  49 
Adjusted  R2  0.2855 0.0527 0.0245 0.0114 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis significance: 01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *. Size dummies: reference 
category: micro firms; location dummies: reference category: capital city.  35
 